German Criminal Law and Its Reform by Schroder, Horst
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 4 Number 1 Article 11 
1965 
German Criminal Law and Its Reform 
Horst Schroder 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Horst Schroder, German Criminal Law and Its Reform, 4 Duq. L. Rev. 97 (1965). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol4/iss1/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS REFORM*
HORST SCHRODERt
It is to be assumed that anyone who proposes reform does so because
he is convinced that the existing state of affairs is unsatisfactory and
therefore requires improvement. This goes for the factory manager who
employs an efficiency expert as well as for the legislator who decides to
pass a new law in lieu of an old one. It is, therefore, impossible to talk
about the reform of the German criminal law and about the new Draft
Code without, at the same time, taking a glance at the existing state of
law which is supposed to be reformed thereby.
The German Penal Code dates back to the year 1871. One might
think that this factor, alone, is sufficient to demonstrate the need for
reform. That, however, would hardly be convincing. In Europe there are
far older penal codes, for example, the 150-year-old Code Pgnal.' There-
fore, a code which is merely 90 years old seems to be rather chipper.
Moreover, the Code, as drafted in 1871, is not the same piece of legisla-
tion which survives as today's German Penal Code. Since 1871, there
have been over 60 amendments; also, material segments of the entire
Code have been completely reformed.
Foremost, the reform has affected the number and content of the
various penal provisions. By way of example, section 49a 2 was inserted
* This article is based on the German Draft Penal Code of 1962 which, with some
minor exceptions, follows its predecessor, the German Draft Penal Code of 1960. The
"General Part" of the latter, first and second divisions, has been published in English transla-
tion as an Appendix to Mueller, The German Draft Criminal Code of 1960-An Evaluation
in Terms of American Criminal Law, U. ILL. L.F. 25 (1961). Excerpts in this paper, con-
cerning provisions which have not been changed in the new draft, have been produced there-
from with permission. A translation of the current German Penal Code by Mueller and
Burgenthal, with an introduction by this author, has been published in 1961 as Volume 4 of
the American Series of Foreign Penal Codes of the Comparative Criminal Law Project of
New York University. The complete translation of the German Draft Penal Code of 1962 is
scheduled for publication in 1966, as Volume 11 of the American Series of Foreign Penal
Codes.
f Dean and Professor of Law, University of Tiibingen, Germany; Judge, Supreme Court,
Stuttgart, Germany. Visiting Professor, New York University, 1960-61.
Editor's Note: This is the second of a four part Criminal Law Symposium .which is dedi-
cated by its authors to the memory of the late Professor Paul W. Tappan,
whom the world of criminology lost too soon. The remaining articles which
will appear in the next two successive issues are: Arrest, Prosecution and
Police Power in the Federal Republic of Germany by Cyril D. Robinson;
and The Principle of Harm in the Concept of Crime by Albin Eser.
1. See MoRaEu ANsD MuELLER, THE FRENCH PENAL CODE (1960), especially the Introduc-
tion by Marc Ancel, at 1-13.
2. Since first conceived, this section has been amended several times. The present
formulation dates from 1953. It provides for the punishability of solicitation and con-
spiracy, acceptance of an offer, or declaration of willingness to commit a felony. Comparable
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when a Belgian blacksmith, named Duchesne, declared, to a Catholic
bishop, his willingness to murder Bismarck-if the bishop so desired.
One must remember that this was during the so-called cultural conflict
between church and state in Germany. However, the bishop was not
willing to accept the offer. Upon examination, it was found that neither
the Belgian nor the German Criminal Code contained any provision under
which such an offer to commit a felony could be punished. Therefore,
both nations agreed to incorporate similar provisions into their penal
codes. Currently, there are new provisions, such as those governing the
unauthorized deprivation of motor vehicles (joyriding legislation),' the
extent of jurisdiction over offenses committed abroad,4 and political
propaganda and subversion in the cold war.5 During the course of routine
reform, such important matters as the law of homicide, perjury, and the
forms of participation were amended. Praeter-intentional liability (like
felony-murder)-was abolished.6
But more important than structural and numerical changes in penal
provisions is the complete change of the system of penal consequences
or sanctions. When the penal code was first promulgated, it knew only
one reaction to crime-punishment. In consonance with the doctrines of
the German idealistic philosophy, this meant retributive and vindictive
to Anglo-American law, solicitation requires no commission of the crime solicited. See,
People v. Bush, 4 Hill. 133 (N.Y. 1843); Regina v. Banks, 12 C.C.C. 393 (1873). Likewise,
as in American law, the German law punishes the successful solicitation as instigation, i.e.,
accessoryship. See GERMAN PENAL CODE § 48. Compare, 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
c. 29, § 16; CLARK AND MARSHALL, LAW OF Ca. ES 454 (6th ed. Wingersky, 1958). Note,
however, that Anglo-American law requires physical absence from the scene of the crime for
the accessory before the fact. This is not required under German law. As to conspiracy,
German law envisages an agreement only between persons who proposed to become
principals and conspire to commit the felony. The conspiracy merges with the felony upon
commission, as, under German law, does every other activity in the nature of attempt or
preparation. The acceptance of an offer, specially covered by § 49a, would complete the
conspiracy at common law, but had to be made specially punishable at German law because
of the restriction of the German conspiracy concept to potential principals. The declaration
of willingness to commit a felony ordinarily would not be punishable at common law.
3. GERMAN PENAL CODE § 248b.
4. GERMAN PENAL CODE §§ 3-4.
5. GERMAN PENAL CODE §§ 88-89.
6. See GERMAN PENAL CODE § 56. Prior to this amendment in 1953, Praeter-intentional
liability-existed in Germany in the form of the so-called result-qualified offenses, i.e., modi-
fications of basic crimes committed intentionally, but with unintentionally produced results
for which the code sections prescribed additional punishments, e.g., § 226, assault with fatal
consequences, punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary or by jailing for not less than
three years. Ordinarily assault carries a punishment of jailing not to exceed three years or
fine, while murder commands a life sentence (§ 211) and manslaughter (§ 212) a minimum
term of five years imprisonment in a penitentiary. Anglo-American law provides a different
solution by turning a crime ordinarily requiring intentionally produced harm into a crime
for which the harm may be produced unintentionally. Felony murder is a typical example.
[Vol. 4:97
GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW
punishment.7 The idea of the protection of the general public and the
pedagogical influence on the perpetrator, in order to resocialize him,
could be practiced only within the framework of punishment and the
sole determinant of the degree of punishment was the gravity of the
crime. This restriction of criminal policy was evidenced by the statistical
rise in crime during the last decades of the 19th century. Demands were
made by the sociological school, founded by von Liszt, for a reform of
the German criminal law with respect to its criminological outlook. There
was no immediate result because a new penal code could not be created
at that time. Nevertheless, new criminological devices were introduced,
piecemeal, into the old code. For example, short term jail sentences for
first offenders, which had created more harm than good, were, to a great
extent, abolished. Thus, in 1924, it was made possible to impose a fine,
in lieu of a jail sentence of not more than three months, provided that
the purpose of the punishment could be attained.' This was true even
though such fines were not specifically envisaged by the Code. In 1953,
with the introduction of the suspended sentence for the purpose of pro-
bation, this old and established common law institution, which had al-
ready been introduced by the first Juvenile Court Law of 1923, was also
taken into the Penal Code. It, too, is splendidly capable of avoiding the
imposition of damaging short terms of imprisonment.
In 1933, another reform formulated in earlier draft codes, namely, the
more effective protection of the community against dangerous habitual
and insane criminals, as well as the possibility of resocialization of the
perpetrator by institutionalization, was fulfilled. The habitual criminal
may be incarcerated as long as he is a threat to society and, if necessary,
for life (so-called protective custody). This measure, rarely resorted
to, is used only in extremely grave cases. The dangerous insane offender
may be committed to an asylum. The offender addicted to alcohol or
narcotics may be placed in a correctional institution devoted to this
particular purpose; whereas, the asocial migrant type offender might be
placed in a workhouse for rehabilitation purposes. However, if the results
are not promising, he might be kept there for the protection of the
general public.'
With such amendments the major demands of criminological reform,
which were heard at the beginning of the German reform movement,
have certainly been fulfilled. One can say, with a clear conscience, that
the German criminal law reform has taken place.
7. KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw-THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT, Pt. 11, § 49, E (Hastie Transl.),
reprinted in COHEN & COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEG. PHIL., 320, at 322
(1951).
8. GER N PENAL CODE § 27b. This was accomplished in the sweep of the so-called
Emminger Reform, which also resulted in the abolition of the Anglo-American type jury.
9. GERMAN PENAL CODE §§ 42a-n.
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For that reason it is strange that officially the question of whether a
new and major German reform is necessary and desirable has never been
asked. After comprehensive research and comparative studies, submitted
to the Ministry of Justice in 1953,10 the Minister appointed a commission
in 1954 which was charged with the task of preparing a draft of a new
German criminal code. Therefore, it seems to have affirmatively answered,
at that time, the question of whether or not reform was necessary.
Nevertheless, the question has popped up again and again, and opinions
have been uttered to the effect that such a reform is neither desirable
nor appropriate. One of the most serious charges made was that the
introduction of a new German criminal code would lead to a material
loss of legal certainty. We must remember that a new law does not reveal
its effect automatically but gains body and significance only by reason
of court interpretation. This may take some time. The interpretation
which the courts plate upon a statute-a perpetual process-creates a
firm and reliable basis for the behavior of the populace who have to live
by that law. The value of legal certainty is necessarily sacrificed when-
ever an existing law is replaced by a new one. Obviously, such sacrifice
should be made only if absolutely necessary. Is it absolutely necessary?
Leading German jurists doubt this and have asked the question: "Are
there judgments of the courts which are bad and unjust because such
result was demanded by the code?" The answer is a clear "no." These
authorities have also doubted whether the desires for a new, systematic
and perhaps even aesthetic quality of the codified law (which may explain
the wish for a unification of the somewhat multifarious nature of the
amended existing penal code) is a sufficient legitimation of a new criminal
draft code. At this point I cannot pursue this question any further. In
any event, the German Ministry of Justice has affirmatively answered
the. question of the need of a criminal law reform and has consequently
appointed a so-called Grand Commission of Penal Reform. The mem-
bers of this Commission are lawyers from all branches of the profession,
that is, judges, defense attorneys, prosecuting attorneys, civil services
officials, parliamentarians, and professors of criminal law. The Ministry
selected the members of the Commission, acting occasionally on the
recommendation of the various states and their administrations. The
Commission that undertook this task can be described by the term
"commission of experts." They-voted on the various disputed provisions
of the proposed code, but the Ministry, itself, made the ultimate decision
on its contents. In any event, the draft is that of the Ministry who is
responsible to the Cabinet and Parliament for its contents. This means
that many of the draft provisions, as approved by the Cabinet, do not
represent the views of a majority of the Commission.
'10. The materials and expositions are published in MARBIALEN ZUR SmRECHTSREFO,
I-I1 (1954).
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The Commission had been at work for six years." It presented various
interim drafts, namely one pertaining only to the General Part and two
versions of the entire code, before completion of the final draft. Although,
according to earlier prognostications, the Ministry of Justice expected
that the Parliament expiring in 1957 would pass the new penal code,
the final draft was not submitted to the Parliament until 1960. Since
that parliamentary session expired in 1961 without having passed the
law, the draft, with some minor changes, was again presented to the
Lower House in 1962 (Draft 1962). After the first reading, it was re-
ferred to a special parliamentary subcommittee where it is still under
debate. This means that the code cannot be passed by the end of this
session. Thus, we can only hope that the next Parliament, which begins
near the end of 1965, will be more successful.
In an attempt to characterize the present draft, I should say, first of
all, that it is more voluminous than the present penal code. This is the
result of an attempt to reach perfection and to examine in detail even
such questions as hitherto had been left for the judiciary. For example,
the question of whether or not the interruption of a pregnancy in special
medical or other cases should be lawful, 12 and the detailed and highly
11. The minutes of its twenty-two working sessions are published in NiEscHRnrrFN
UBER DIE SITZUNEGENE DER GROSSEN StAzFREcsTs KommaissioN, I-XIV (1956-1960). The total
published output of the commission now comprises 26 volumes, folio size.
12. Because of the highly controversial nature of the provisions, they are reproduced for
the benefit of the reader. Note that in cases of an erroneous assumption of legal indication
for (lawful) abortion, the code now provides for lesser punishment under a special provision,
while, heretofore, the German Supreme Court had affirmed the convictions for intentional
abortion.
TITLE FOUR
SURGICAL OPERATIONS AND MEDICAL TREATMNT
§ 157 Surgical Interruption of Pregnancy Because of Danger to Patient
(1) The killing of a foetus by a physician is not punishable under § 140 if according to
medical knowledge and experience, danger of death or of undue and serious injury to the body
or health (§ 147, paragraph 2) of the woman can be averted only by the abortion.
(2) The killing of a child at birth is not punishable under § 134 if done by a physician
under the requirements of paragraph 1.
§ 158 Medically Unjustified Interruption of Pregnancy
(1) If a physician performs the killing of a foetus or child at birth under the erroneous
assumption that the requirements of § 157 are satisfied and if he is to be blamed for the
error, he shall be punished with jailing up to three years or with penal custody.
(2) An attempt is punishable.
§ 159 Unconsented Interruption of Pregnancy
(1) Any physician who kills a foetus or child being born where the requirements of
§ 157 are satisfied or in the erroneous assumption that such requirements are satisfied, without
1. The woman having consented, or
2. the medical advisory office having certified the requirements for the operation
indicated in § 157, shall be punished in cases under number 1 with jailing up to
three years or in cases under number 2 with jailing up to one year or penal
custody.
(2) The act shall not be punishable under paragraph 1, number 1, if the consent could
1965-19661
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complicated treatment of the question of its necessity.13 Moreover, hereto-
fore undefined technical terms, such as intention and negligence, are now
spelled out. 4 Such endeavors have resulted in an appreciable expansion
in the definitions of the various crimes contained in the Special Part.
For example, the question of the illegality of artificial insemination has
been elaborately dealt with, resulting in this practice being declared un-
lawful. The sphere of offenses against privacy has been expanded."3
However, on the whole, these new formulations do not present anything
novel. In the vast majority of cases the draft restricts itself to molding
the results of case law into the form of a statute.
Overall, we can assess the position of the draft code as rather con-
servative. This is especially true for the sphere of the criminological
question, that is, the criminological goals and their practical attainment
through the sanctions employed by the law. 6 The draft code retains a
dualism of penal consequences. It continues to distinguish between
punishments on the one hand and measures of security and rehabilitation
on the other. These two types of penal consequences are basically of
different stature, both in their aim and in their justification. Punishment
is regarded as vindication and retribution for the wrong which the of-
fender has committed. It is inherent in the very concept of crime as a con-
sequence or just dessert; its content being determined by the relation
between the gravity of the offense and the reaction of the politically
organized community to the perpetrator's deed. Since the gravity of the
deed is essentially determined by the guilt of the offender, the criminal
law of the draft code is a mens rea determined law. That means not
only the recognition of the premise that there should be no punishment
without guilt, but also the recognition of the further maxim, that the
only be obtained by a postponement of the operation which might put the woman in danger
of death or serious injury to body or health (§ 147, paragraph 2) and circumstances do not
compel the conclusion that the woman would refuse consent. The act shall not be punishable
under paragraph 1, number 2, if, because of the danger indicated in sentence 1, the certification
of the medical advisory office cannot be obtained in time.
(3) If the physician acts in the erroneous assumption that the requirements of paragraph
2, sentence 1, are satisfied and if he is to be blamed for the error he shall be punished with
jailing up to two years, penal custody or a fine. If he acts in the erroneous assumption that
the requirements of paragraph 2, sentence 2, are satisfied and if he is to be blamed for the
error, he shall be punished with penal custody or a fine.
(4) An attempt is punishable.
(5) If merely the consent of the woman is lacking, the act shall be prosecuted only upon
complaint.
13. GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE §§ 39-40 (1962). For detailed analysis see Mueller,
op. cit. supra note *.
14. See text infra note*23.
15. GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE § 203 (1962).
16. See GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE §§ 182-186 (1962), extending over the entire sphere
of defamation, up to and including slander, concerning a private matter, regardless of its
truth, and absent justifiable cause and public interest.
[Vol. 4:97
GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW
measure of punishment must correspond to the measure of guilt-the
so-called maxim of proportionality. There is doubt expressed, however,
if this last maxim has been sufficiently realized in the most recent version
of the draft17 and, as such, has been the subject of frequent and force-
ful controversies among German criminal scientists.
As for the measure of safety and rehabilitation, for example, the
protective custody or the detention in an asylum, the so-called dualism
of penal consequences means that the offender will suffer a restriction
of his freedom without imposing upon him the ethical stigma of true
punishment. The measures of safety and rehabilitation find their sole
justification in necessity and in the community's endeavor to resocialize
its fallen members. The number and kind of the so-called measures have
been increased. Besides the already existing measures of safety and re-
habilitation, such as protective custody, detention in an institution for
cure or for drug addiction, the draft code proposes two entirely new
measures: preventive custody 8 and protective surveillance. 9
Preventive custody is the institutionalization of juveniles and adoles-
cents, ranging in age from sixteen to twenty-seven years, who show
proclivities for habitual criminality. The holding of a habitual criminal
in protective custody, which is permitted by the present code, was con-
sidered inappropriate in such cases, because, in the eyes of the public,
the perpetrator would be characterized as an incorrigible, habitual
criminal when, perhaps, he has not as yet reached that stage. This con-
stituted the reason for the introduction of a new concept of preventive
custody which has met with more optimism than the old institution of
protective custody. However, in discussions concerning penal reform the
preventive custody provision has not been free from criticism. This
innovation was introduced as a result of the pressure exerted by criminol-
ogists. They must bear the responsibility, for it is their view which re-
gards this institution as more appropriate and successful in the rehabili-
tation of offenders. The criminologists have maintained that with scientific
means they are capable of giving the proper diagnoses and prognoses to
insure a successful application of this measure.
The other new measure is protective surveillance for perpetrators of
certain crimes. This is to be imposed after completion of the penal
sentence as its purpose is community safety. To this extent it is the
successor to the existing institution of police surveillance ° and is de-
signed to prevent the perpetrator's regression into criminality. The
17. GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE § 60 (1962). "The basis for fixing a punishment shall
be the guilt of the perpetrator."
18. GERMAN DRaAr PENAL CODE § 86 (1962).
19. GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE §§ 91-98 (1962).
20. GERMAN PENAL CODE §§ 38-39.
1965-19661
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optimism which bespeaks this institution seems somewhat unjustified if
one examines the categories of perpetrators which it encompasses. Among
these are convicts who did not qualify for release on parole, because, in
accordance with the provisions of section 79, the judge could not take
the responsibility that, if released, the defendant would not revert to
crime. Consequently, there is little hope that this institution will be
more successful in rehabilitating him.
In the area of punishment, the new draft 'code, following existing
law, does not utilize capital punishment, but retains deprivation of
liberty by penitentiary and jail sentences. By introducing the so-called
"Strafhaft" (incarceration) ,21 it adds a further mode of deprivation of
liberty, so as to make possible a further differentiation. This is a mode
of detention designed to demonstrate that the penal offense, which the
perpetrator has committed, is extremely insignificant and, therefore, is
not subject to the stigma of true criminality. Since petty misdemeanors
have been removed from the draft code, this third kind of deprivation
of liberty recognizes the fact that even within the sphere of gross mis-
demeanors there is an area of petty criminality. For a long time, the
differentiation between German penitentiary and jail sentences has
been attacked by those contending that this is a mere nominal distinc-
tion. 2 Many demanded that a uniform mode of deprivation of liberty
be created, which then, according to a criminological diagnosis and
prognosis of the perpetrator, should be adjusted, on an administrative
level, in order to be applicable to the particular convict. However, the
draft code did not follow these demands and, it seems to me, justifiably
so. It is particularly significant that in a jurisdiction which has abolished
capital punishment the gravity of the offense should be expressed by a
different gravity of detention, a mode of characterizing the worst and
most heinous felonies by the very sentence which, after all, expresses
the disapproval of society.
The discussions which concerned the questions of substantive criminal
law were more frequent and vehement than the discussions on the
criminological aspects of the new draft. Whereas the practitioners vir-
tually agreed along conservative lines on the criminological questions,
there were controversies on the question of substantive criminal law-
the so-called dogmatical questions. This is quite understandable in a
country like Germany, where the desire for a complete, all-rounded and
logical system is extremely strong. Therefore, several members of the
commission fought fierce battles along dogmatic grounds in order to
achieve recognition, within the draft code, of their own petty theories.
It was equally obvious that such attempts were bound to fail. After all,
21. GERMAN DRAPT PENAL CODE § 43 (1962).
22. See Ruscnm & KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISE[MENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 62-71 (1939).
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legislation is not a scientific or scholarly task, but rather a practical and
political one. For with the many doctrinal controversies within a democ-
racy, there is need to compromise. This is evidenced throughout the draft
code. It is almost impossible to say that the draft caters to any one
particular doctrinal opinion, though one could say, that by and large,
it reflects the results of the present state of the case law. Of course, it
cannot be expected that case law, which has reached just and practical
solutions, should be forfeited in favor of some scholarly dogma. In the
course of the debates within the commission, the readiness to engage in
elaborate theoretical and doctrinal statements and dissertations has con-
sistently decreased. Nevertheless, the draft code contains several novel
definitions. For example, intention and negligence are now defined.2"
However, I am not sure that this will survive into positive law. The
endless difficulty of attempting to differentiate between intention-in the
form of dolus eventualis, an approving of chance-taking with respect to
the result, and mere recklessness, the latter in Germany regarded pre-
dominantly as a form of negligence 24-makes it almost mandatory that
the statute itself be silent on this point. A definition would impede
development of a better definition by scholarly endeavor or case law.
The systematical structure of the draft code is the same as that of the
existing code. It follows the European pattern of separating the code into
23. GERaIAN DRAFT PsNA CODE § 16 (1962).
§ 17 Purpose and Scienter.
(1) Anybody who seeks to effectuate a circumstance for which the law requires
purposefulness, acts purposefully.
(2) Anybody who knows or takes for granted that a circumstance for which the
law requires scienter, is present or will come to pass, acts knowingly.
§ 18 Negligence and Wantonness.
(1) Anybody who fails to exercise that care to which the circumstances and his
personal conditions require him and of which he is capable and for that reason does not
recognize that he is effectuating all the definitional elements of crime, acts negligently.
(2) Anybody who deems it possible that he will effectuate the definitional elements
of a crime, but in violation of duty and in blameworthy fashion trusts that he will not
effectuate them, also acts negligently.
(3) Anybody who acts with gross negligence acts wantonly.
24. Though the concept of recklessness has no agreed upon meaning in American law,
it is sometimes defined as conscious risk taking, though occasionally as simply risk taking,
thus including unconscious recklessness. Moreland would prefer the latter trend. Moreland,
CRMINAL NEGLIGENCE (1944). In any event, one can say that the cases which in American
law would be regarded as recklessness, found no special regulation in German law. According
to the prevailing German option they are partially regarded as forms of intention (dolus
eventualis) partially as forms of negligence, here called conscious negligence, as distinguished
from unconscious negligence. Both are punishable in German law, but not in American law,
although the Model Penal Code proposes to do so. A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. In
Germany there are opinions holding that all conscious negligence should be regarded as
belonging to intention. This corresponds to American criminal law insofar as the concept of
negligence, as distinguished from recklessness, comprises virtually only the cases of uncon-
scious negligence.
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a General Part and a Special Part. 5 The Special Part contains the defi-
nitions of the various offenses while the General Part deals with all
those questions which, regardless of the type of offense involved, are
applicable to the entire body of criminal law. It contains what Professor
Jerome Hall would treat under the category of principles and doctrines. 6
For example, the question of attempt,27 the various forms and degrees
of participation, 8 such matters as jurisdiction29 and the entire range of
penal sanctions,3" as well as all the questions of mens rea3' are treated
in the General Part.
Major improvements have been made within the Special Part. In this
Part, the new draft code has systematically arranged and categorized
the various offense groups, thereby distinguishing it from the present
law. Whereas the present law begins with offenses against the state, the
commission has decided to list the value of life before that of the
political value of the state. First it treats offenses against the person.
This is then followed by the group of offenses against the moral order,
property, public order, the state and its institutions, and the community
of peoples.
Hoping to have conveyed a general impression of the background and
stature of the German Criminal Law reform, I should now like to turn
to the treatment of a few special problems which played a particularly
important role in the debates of the Grand Commission of Penal Reform.
There is, first of all, the basic question of what bearing the mens rea
of the perpetrator should have on the determination of his punishment.
Obviously, there was never any doubt that a perpetrator should not be
punished if he has acted without any mens rea whatsoever. But there
was a debate as to whether or not the maxim of the commensurateness
of guilt and punishment implies that punishment is dependent solely
upon the mens rea of the perpetrator. The realization of such a demand
would, for example, result in the impossibility of imposing a particularly
high punishment for the purpose of deterring the general public. A pre-
dominant number of German scholars are of the opinion that the measure
or extent of the punishment is dependent on the mens rea, in other words,
25. Ancel, The Collection oj European Penal Codes and the Study of Comparative Law,
106 U. PA. L. REv. 329 (1958); Ancel, Introduction to Moreau and Mueller, THE FRENCH
PENAL CODE 1-13 (1960).
26. Hall, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW C. 1 (2nd ed. 1960); Hall, THE
THR FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, in Mueller (ed.), Essays in Criminal
Science 169 (1961).
27. GEMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE §§ 26-28 (1962).
28. GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE §§ 29-36 (1962).
29. GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE §§ 3-6 (1962).
30. GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE §§ 43-59 (1962).
31. GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE §§ 15-25 (1962) and special provisions elsewhere.
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the blameworthiness of the perpetrators. There are, however, groups of
criminal law practitioners with enough influence to press for a formula-
tion which seemingly makes it possible to reach the other alternative-
to allow the possibility of imposing a more severe punishment on a
particular defendant for purposes of deterrence.3 2 The scholars, on the
other hand, have contended that the ethical stigma of criminality and
the moral opprobrium imposable upon his conviction prohibits the im-
position of punishment which he did not "deserve.""3 The ends of deter-
rence may, therefore, be served only within this framework of retribution.
Nevertheless, in imposing punishment, heretofore the case law has not
hesitated to consider even the results caused by the perpetrator for which
he could not be blamed, in the sense that he did not possess mens rea.
To demonstrate the point, the German Supreme Court handed down a
decision which is similar to the famous American case of People v. Good-
man. 4 In the German case a truckdriver had picked up a hitchhiking
girl, had made immoral advances toward her, and when she refused, had
ordered her out of the cab of the truck. In order to avoid being left
standing at a desolate place on the highway, the girl clung to the rear
of the truck. She fell off when the truck started moving and was killed.
Now, while the court in the case of People v. Goodman seemed to have
no difficulty finding the defendant truckdriver guilty of manslaughter,
under those circumstances the German court did have difficulty. How-
ever, it did find that it had to consider the resulting death as an aggrava-
ting circumstance in the determination of the punishment for the under-
lying morals offense.35
Another problem considered important for practical application in
court was the statutory treatment of offenses of omission. An omission
is the non-execution of some activity which the defendant should have
performed. These are offenses in which the statute, itself, makes an
omission criminal, for example, where one spouse fails to pay support
to the other spouse,3" or if somebody with knowledge of the contemplated
commission of a certain felony fails to report this fact to the authorities
or to the contemplated victim.37 But quite apart from these relatively
simple cases are the problem cases of the so-called unreal offenses by
32. See text at note 17 supra.
33. This decision does not mean that preventive ideas have remained unconsidered.
There has been no debate about the necessity of adding to punishments a system of preventive
measures. This was clear from the outset.
34. 182 Misc. 585, 44 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1943), reprinted at HALL AND MUELLER, CASES AND
READINGS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 133 (2nd ed. 1965).
35. 10 B.G.H. St. 260.
36. GERMAN PENAL CODE § 170b.
37. GERMAN PENAL CODE § 138. Compare this with the common law misdemeanor of
misprision of felony, CLARK AND MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES 486-487 (6th ed. Wingersky,
1958); 18 U.S.C. § 4. Note that concealment of the felony is not necessary for criminal lia-
bility under the GERMAN PENAL CODE § 138.
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omission. These are cases in which one cannot tell from the naked statute
how the problem is to be handled. Such a case, for example, would be
a situation where the mother fails to provide food for her child and it
dies, or where the father fails to rescue his drowning child. In such
cases, the court is forced to operate within a definition of a crime phrased
entirely in terms of active commission of an offense. According to the
view prevailing in Germany, as well as in the United States, such statutes
are applicable whenever the perpetrator had a legal duty to act and
failed to do so. This is where the difficulties begin. Frequently, the duties
with which we are concerned are not regulated by statute; therefore,
doubt has been expressed as to whether or not the punishment of such
omissive perpetrators would violate the principle of legality, nullum
crimen sine lege. In order to avoid such difficulties the draft code has
attempted to regulate the legal duty to act. This attempt, however, fell
short of its mark because the duties come from so many spheres of legal
regulation that a uniform treatment is virtually impossible. Hence, the
draft, at best, succeeded in raising the problem but did not solve it.
It imposed the duty to act whenever the omission would be tantamount
to punishable positive action.8
The treatment, in the code, of the problem of mens rea deserves special
attention. One must differentiate between various individual problem
areas within this problematic sphere. First of all, there was the question
of whether or not the draft should attempt to define the concepts of
intention and negligence, which have long been the two German forms
of mens rea. The result was a definition in general accord with that of
the former Reichsgericht, which succeeded in defining mens rea in terms
of "the knowing and intending of the deed and of all its concrete defini-
tional elements."39 There was no doubt about the accuracy of this
definition. The draft's real task, therefore, was establishing the dividing
line between intention and negligence. This border is extremely signifi-
cant because, while all offenses may be committed intentionally, negli-
gence is a crime only where the legislator has so provided.4" Therefore,
the attitude of the offender at the time he committed the offense may
be a decisive factor in his conviction. It would depend upon whether his
attitude qualified as intention or whether it was merely negligence.
The complexity of the problem arises in those cases where the perpetrator
is not certain but surmises that his proposed conduct contains all those
elements which compose criminality. For example, in case of statutory
38. GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE § 13 (1962). Commission by Omission. Anybody who
fails to avert the definitionally required harm specified by a penal statutory provision is
punishable as a principal or accessory, if it was his legal obligation to avert the harm, and if
his conduct, under the circumstances, is tantamount to effecting the definitional elements of
the act by commission.
39. 58 R.G. St. 249; 70 R.G. St. 258.
40. GERMAN Dar PENAL CODE § 15 (1962).
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rape, the perpetrator considers the possibility that the girl with whom
he has sexual intercourse is below the statutory age; or, in a case of
perjury, the perpetrator considers that his statement might be false, or,
in the case of manslaughter, that the rifle shot directed toward game
may hit a passing farmer." Different solutions were reached by criminal
scholars on the one hand and the case law on the other. It is remarkable
that in this area the tendency of case law is not toward one definite
solution of the problem but rather toward several, depending upon what
seemed desirable for a just solution in a given case. Frequently, in sexual
offenses, the courts satisfied themselves with a finding that the perpetrator
did consider the possibility of producing the given harm. On the whole,
the draft follows this approach. It holds the act to be intentional if the
perpetrator considers the possible creation of the criminal harm and with
that contingency occurring prospectively approves of such a result. 2
For example, in the case of a morals offense committed with a minor,
it suffices if the defendant considered the possibility that the person with
whom the offense was committed was not, as yet, of statutory age. This
would still qualify as intentional, because here the defendant considered
the possibility of producing the envisaged harm-the immoral contact
upon a minor. However, there is doubt as to whether or not the court
must affirmatively find that the defendant who considered the possible
result but, nevertheless proceeded, actually approved prospectively of
the creation of this harm, or whether, in view of such possibility, ap-
proval is inherent in his very consideration and decision to continue the
activity. The draft did not answer this hotly debated question, satisfying
itself with the formulation and "not minding the result."
But there was another mens rea question which created far greater
problems. This was the question of the awareness of wrongdoing and
the question of error or ignorance. The point of departure for the draft's
solution differed greatly from that of the American law. After lengthy
debates between adjudication and criminal law scholars, the German
Supreme Court, in 1952, finally recognized that the blameworthiness of
the deed must be based on the perpetrator's decision against right and
for wrong.4 3 It follows, as the. court found, that the awareness of wrong-
doing is, after all, similar to the question of mens rea, as had been
presumed by the old German Supreme Court. 4 Consequently, one should
have expected that the court would recognize intentional criminality only
when the defendant was aware that his act was wrong or unlawful.4 1
41. In most of these cases American law, likewise, would operate either with absolute
liability or would assume recklessness.
42. GER MiN DAFT PENAL CODE § 16 (1962). Supra note 23..
'43. 2 B.G.H. St. 194; 5 N.J.W. 593; 7 J.Z. 335 (1952). See Kiichenhoff, Law and Con-
science, 5 NATURAL L.F. 120, 123 (1960).
44. 61 R.G. St. 258; 63 R.G. St. 218.
45. While most common law courts held contra, an American trend in this direction has
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Instead, the German Supreme Court was ready to find impunity for the
perpetrator who did not know that he did something wrong and had no
possibility of gaining such knowledge. That would correspond roughly
to the holding of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Lambert
v. California.46 But, in the Court's opinion, the offender, who fails to
ascertain this knowledge, must, because of this blameworthiness, be pun-
ished for intentional commission of the crime.47 Should he not be punished
in accordance with the real basis of his blameworthiness, namely for
negligent commission of the crime, if that is punishable? Time prevents
me from going into more detail of this rather lame compromise with
principles. In summation, the draft code punishes without limit anybody
who knows that he is doing something prohibited. 8 It also punishes for
the intention with regard to his possible ignorance. However, in this case,
the perpetrator can be punished only if his ignorance rests on negligence
and if, in such cases, negligence happens to be punishable under the
provision of the code.4 All the other cases in which the perpetrator knows
all the elements of his action but, nevertheless, does not know that his
action is prohibited must be contrasted with this type of error. It is in
the former situation that the previously discussed solution of the Su-
preme Court and the draft code is applicable.
Standing in between these two groups of errors, there is a third group
of cases in which the perpetrator erroneously assumes the existence of
circumstances which would justify his action, for example, if he errone-
ously assumes that he is subject to an attack by the decedent, or that he
is in danger of losing his own life. In such instances today's case law
holds that the perpetrator lacks the intention to commit the offense.
Consequently, there remains no possibility of punishing him for an in-
tentional commission. ° I agree with this position. It is plausible because
the perpetrator's attitude toward right and wrong is recognizable not
only from the application of the definitional elements, but also from the
erroneous supposition that justifiable grounds are present. But in such
cases the draft code has proposed still another solution. In the case of
all such circumstances which make the perpetrator's activity appear
permissible, as, for example, in the case of supposed self-defense, the
present solution is applicable. That means there is no intention, but the
perpetrator may be punished for his negligence insofar as negligence is
been noticed, see United States v. Curtin, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 427, 26 C.M.R. 207 (1958), in general
see Mueller, Criminal Law and Procedure, ANN. SURVEy Am. L. 111, 114-115 (1959).
46. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
47. Corresponding to American practice. See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAw 376-414 (2nd ed. 1960).
48. GERMAN Di~r PENAL CODE § 21 (1962), with reference to the mitigation provisions
of § 64.
49. GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE § 19 (1962).
50. 3 B.G.H. St. 106; 3 B.G.H. St. 194; 3 B.G.H. St. 357.
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punishable.5 1 However, if the perpetrator erroneously assumes the pres-
ence of circumstances which remove only his guilt (his mens rea) but
not the unlawfulness of his act, the draft code has provided a solution
which amounts to a bad compromise. His action is regarded as having
been intentional, but the penal consequences do not correspond to those
cases involving an error of unlawfulness, rather, the punishment is fur-
ther mitigated.52
The Penal Reform Commission witnessed long and vigorous debates on
the question of capital punishment, a problem on which opinions will
remain divided. Of course, in my opinion, for Germany these debates
have very little practical significance. Article 102 of the Constitution
provides that capital punishment is abolished, and it would require
a constitutional amendment to reinstate it. It is impossible to find a
two-thirds majority of Parliament for such a purpose. Strangely enough,
a national plebiscite would probably result in the reintroduction of
capital punishment. But the German Constitution does not permit a
plebiscite. Therefore, there is absolutely no possibility for the reintroduc-
tion of capital punishment.
Finally, I would like to comment on the draft code's solutions to the
problems of murder and manslaughter. I attribute particular significance
to the problem of homicide because these offenses play a major role in
American law and frequently are specifically utilized for the purpose of
developing general doctrines and principles.
Until 1941 the German Penal Code differentiated murder from man-
slaughter in accordance with long historical tradition, namely on the
element of deliberation or, as you would call it, deliberation and premedi-
tation. Thus, murder was the killing of a human being with deliberation,
while manslaughter was the same offense but without deliberation.
This corresponds to typical American differentiation between first degree
and second degree murder. Such a qualitative differentiation attributes
an unique conceptual quality to murder. But this solution to the problem
was subjected to increasing criticism, because ultimately the difference
between life and death depended on such a flimsy criterion as the offend-
er's consideration of the pros or cons of murder, without ever evaluating
the motivations for his deliberation. For example, the offender who com-
mits euthanasia to alleviate an incurably diseased and suffering relative
may well have deliberated the pros and cons before killing, but
certainly his offense does not deserve the same characterization as that
of a well planned gang-land killing.53
In 1941, therefore, the German Penal Code switched to a more quanti-
51. GERMAN DAFr PENAL CODE § 20 (1962).
52. GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE § 40.2 (1962).
53. People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920)-a most unsatisfactory result.
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tative delimitation of the two offenses. It recognized that, ultimately,
murder is nothing but a characterization of the more serious cases of
intentional killing and that the criteria for determining the gravity of
such an offense may be quite multifarious. In fact, one can say that
murder is only a title, not a concept. Thus, section 2 11 was cast into a
new form, which, in the nature of a catalog, lists a multitude of circum-
stances which elevate manslaughter to murder. Sometimes this determina-
tion is made relying particularly on the motivation of the perpetrator
and his blameworthy attitude toward the life he took, sometimes relying
more on characterization of his specially dangerous or serious modes of
perpetration.54 Nevertheless, to some extent the difficulty remained in
that there would be cases which would ipso facto fall under one or the
other of the categories specified by the law, but would not amount to
particularly serious and blameworthy modes of killing. For example, in
one of its murder categories the code makes maliciously deceitful killing
murder. Now, obviously, the mercy killing of a seriously diseased relative
already doomed to death may be accomplished with the application of
deceit, but without elevating this deed to the severe cases which the
murder category attempts to embrace.55 Therefore, the opinion was fre-
quently voiced that the catalog of section 2 11 is not binding, but that it
contains only criteria recommending its application by the court. This
means that in exceptional cases-in which the code's intention, to embrace,
as murder, only the most serious cases of killing, is not fulfilled-the judge
would be able to reduce a particular killing from murder to manslaughter,
even though the criteria set forth in the murder category are formally
met. Principally, the new draft code retains the system of the applicable
law.56 However, it has greatly reduced the necessary requirements for
elevating manslaughter to murder. There remains only killing for reasons
of homicidal lust, for the excitement or satisfaction of the offender's
sexual urges, for motives of greed and for the purpose of facilitating
another crime.57
There is an interesting novelty contained in paragraph 2 of section
134. Anyone who kills another with premeditation is similarly punishable
for murder. But the draft catered to the objections which I had long
voiced, by permitting an exception when a perpetrator has killed for
54. It is interesting to note that in both German and American criminal law, the basic
form of homicide is the intentional killing. But it is significant that German law considers
this basic form to be manslaughter (§ 212 GERmAN PENAL CODE) while it is considered to be
murder (in the second degree) in most American jurisdictions. This is usually subject to the
defendant's power to prove the killing to have been merely voluntary, or even involuntary,
manslaughter, and the state's ability to raise it to murder in the first degree.
55. The Draft Penal Code recognizes a special homicide offense of mercy killing sub-
jecting it to drastically mitigated punishments. GERMAN DRAfr PENAL CODE § 134-3 (1962).
56. GER AN DRAT PENAL CODE §§ 134-135, 138 (1962).
57. GER AN DRAPT PENAL CODE § 135.1 (1962).
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reasons of mercy, desperation or similar motives which materially lessen
his guilt and blameworthiness.
I am aware of the fact that I have discussed only a small portion of
the problems which the draft code raises and which are obviously worthy
of discussion. Nevertheless, I hope to have succeeded in conveying a
general impression of the multifariousness of its problems which, I
hasten to emphasize, differ in many respects from the way these problems
are approached by the American criminal law. However, these problems
may lend themselves as an aperture through which the American criminal
lawyer may gain some insight into the German criminal law. Perhaps he
may even be stimulated into reviewing his own old and accustomed ways
of handling problems of criminal law.

